Puzzles of public opinion: Why Soviet population supports the transition to capitalism since the 1980S by Popov, Vladimir
MPRA
Munich Personal RePEc Archive
Puzzles of public opinion: Why Soviet
population supports the transition to
capitalism since the 1980S
Vladimir Popov
New Economic School
24. December 2014
Online at http://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/60915/
MPRA Paper No. 60915, posted 27. December 2014 05:40 UTC
1 
 
PUZZLES OF PUBLIC OPINION: WHY SOVIET POPULATION SUPPORTS THE 
TRANSITION TO CAPITALISM SINCE THE 1980S 
Vladimir Popov 
 
 
 
 
ABSTRACT 
Why even after the dramatic increase in inequality in the 1990s and after the emergence and 
enrichment of “oligarchs”, the alternative (leftist, social democratic) economic policies that could 
have improved material and social wellbeing of the majority of the population is not supported by this 
majority? It is argued that in immature democracies (without efficient restrictions for the participation 
of private capital in politics) mass media and electoral campaigns are controlled by the rich, so there is 
vicious circle: market reforms and private property create the class of the wealthy “oligarchs” that are 
not only interested in these reforms, but also have power to maintain their political and economic 
might through mass media and democratic elections. The return of public opinion to the “norm” so 
that it reflects interests of the majority is possible only if mass media and political process are 
separated from private capital and private financing. 
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PUZZLES OF PUBLIC OPINION: WHY SOVIET POPULATION SUPPORTS THE 
TRANSITION TO CAPITALISM SINCE THE 1980S 
Vladimir Popov 
 
In the late 1980s, during the time of Gorbachev's perestroika, the majority of the population in the 
Soviet Union was displeased with the socialist system, and wanted it to be reformed. They hoped 
that the reforms would enhance living standards, ensure progress in the social sphere, strengthen 
law and order, promote democracy, improve the international situation and bolster the USSR’s 
international standing. In reality the opposite happened: the economy sunk into a protracted 
recession, over 90 percent of people saw their living standards plummet, pensions and benefits 
shrank, free education and healthcare were mostly replaced with paid services, corruption, crime 
and a shadow economy proliferated and NATO expanded eastward, coming close to Russia's 
borders.   
 
This paper traces how these changes were reflected in the public consciousness. It's commonly 
known that objective changes are not always adequately reflected in public opinion. People are 
more likely to overestimate rather than underestimate their abilities. They forecast situations on 
the basis of past experience (adaptive expectations) and are far from being rational in their 
decision-making. The transition from socialism to capitalism, like other turning-points in history, 
provides rich material for an analysis of the patterns in the evolution of public consciousness. A 
look at how public preferences in the USSR and Russia have shifted since the late 1980s can 
reveal at least several puzzles.  
 
1. The political class and the intelligentsia mostly supported the market reforms in the late 
1980s and the early 1990s and managed to convince large masses of the population of 
their relevance, even though earlier the majority of them had been committed to socialist 
ideals.  
 
2. The majority, or at least a considerable minority, of the population supported the shock 
therapy of 1991, even though this version of reform led to a dramatic decline in their 
living standards and social status (in the 1990s, the reforms benefitted between five and 10 
percent of the population). 
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3. Even today, despite the emergence and rapid enrichment of “oligarchs”, along with a surge 
in inequality, this majority doesn’t support an alternative economic policy (left-wing or 
social democratic) that could improve the living standards and social status of large 
masses of population. 
 
This paper attempts to explain these “puzzles.”  
 
1. How the elite became disappointed with the planned system: The loss of social dynamism 
(1970s-1980s) 
The Soviet planned system reached its peak in the early 1960s. Though the economy continued to 
grow even after that zenith, its pace was consistently slowing down (Figure 1). Life expectancy 
hit 70 years in 1965 and stopped growing, vacillating between 68 and 70 years until 1991 (Figure 
2). Crime, homicide, suicide and alcohol abuse began mounting starting in the 1960s (Figure 3). 
Khrushchev’s “thaw” in public and cultural life came to an end in the mid-1960s, and all hopes 
for “socialism with a human face” were thwarted by the invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968.  
 
 
Source: Easterly, W., Fisher, S. (1995) ‘The Soviet Economic Decline’. The World Bank Economic 
Review, Vol. 9, No.3, pp. 341-71.  
Figure 1. Average annual labor productivity growth rates in the Soviet economy 
by periods, percent 
 
0 
2 
4 
6 
8 
10 
12 
1928-39 1940-49 1950-59 1960-69 1970-79 1980-87 
Official data 
 
Alternative estimate 
4 
 
 
Figure 2. Mortality rate per 1,000 individuals (left-hand scale) and life expectancy, in years, 
right-hand scale) 
 
Source: State Committee for Statistics.  
 
Figure 3. Alcohol consumption and mortality rates 
 
Source: State Committee for Statistics, Demoscope, No. 263-264, October 30-November 12, 2006. 
5 
 
 
To understand the extent to which the 1970s and 1980s were a “period of stagnation,” we should 
measure the system’s dynamism in the preceding period. Previously, the Soviet economic growth 
rates were indeed very high: Between the 1930s and 1950s, there were just two countries in the world 
– Japan and the USSR – that were closing the gap between them and the USA. While Russia under 
the Tsars, like all of Europe, was falling farther behind the United States throughout the 19
th
 century, 
the Soviet Union began catching up rapidly, with its per capita GDP rising from less than 30 percent 
in 1913 (and 20 percent in 1928) to almost 40 percent of the US level by the late 1960s, despite a 
wartime fall-off (Figure 4).  
 
 
Figure 4. Per capita GDP in the USSR and Russia in % of the US level 
 
Source: Maddison, A. Statistics on World Population, GDP and Per Capita GDP, 1-2006 AD (Last 
update: October 2008, horizontal file, copyright Angus Maddison) - http://www.ggdc.net/maddison/ 
 
 
In the mid-1960s, the average life expectancy in the USSR was 70 years, or just a year or two less 
than in the USA. This was an unprecedented social achievement for a country, the per capita GDP of 
which was under 40 percent of America’s and the per capita consumption of which was even less, 
hovering at around 30 percent of the US figure (because of a higher share of investment and defense 
spending). The USSR’s homicide rate in the late 1950s and the early 1960s was much lower than in 
the early 20
th
 century, and was approximately the same as in the late 19
th
 century (Figure 5).  
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Generally, no matter how you slice it, the Soviet catch-up development model, for all its 
shortcomings, was certainly highly competitive in the 1950s and 1960s, both in the economy and the 
social sphere. Actually it was no less attractive than the East Asian (Chinese) model today. It is for 
this reason that developing countries attempted – with different degrees of success – to imitate this 
model even when the USSR did not offer any economic aid in exchange. It’s another matter where 
this competitiveness went in the 1970s and 1980s, and what led to the stagnation. Everyone answers 
this question in his own way [Попов, 2007, 2008; Popov, 2007]. But the loss of competitiveness 
proved fatal for socialism. The 1970s and 1980s was a time when the Soviet elite, which earlier 
accepted its restricted consumption as “temporary teething problems,” began turning away from the 
socialist idea.  
 
 
Figure 5. Mortality from external causes – various reasons: Russian Empire - RSFSR - Russian 
Federation, 1870-2000 (logarithmic scale) 
 
per 100,000 individuals  
 
1. all external causes; 2. unintentional (including production-related); 3. suicide; 4. homicide; 5. 
unspecified (intentional or unintentional); 6. only production-related. 
Source: Demoscope, No. 29-30, August 13-26, 2001. 
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As the story goes, in 1964, Honduran Minister of Communications Rodriguez received Minister 
Ivanov, his Soviet counterpart, in Tegucigalpa. After formal talks, Rodriguez invited Ivanov to his 
hacienda. He showed Ivanov his seven bedroom mansion, swimming pool, garages, hectares of 
orchards, and domestic servants. He took him for a fishing trip on his personal yacht and offered 
him a luxurious dinner with exotic foods. He gave him a ride in his limousine and told of how his 
children were studying at Ivy League universities in the United States. Ivanov was not 
discouraged and not impressed. He knew that the people of Honduras were poor and many were 
starving. In the Soviet Union, he knew that while living standards were lower than in the West, 
there was no starvation. He knew that life expectancy in the Soviet Union was twenty years 
higher than in Honduras. Soviet scientists were receiving Nobel prizes, Yuri Gagarin was the first 
man in space, the Soviet ballet was the best in the world, and Soviet nuclear submarines could 
roam the far seas. He was proud that his state was building the most advanced and socially equal 
civilization in human history.  
 
Twenty years later in 1984, Minister Petrov, Ivanov’s successor, visited Honduras to talk with his 
counterpart Minister Gonzales, the successor of Rodriguez. He was unpleasantly surprised and 
even a little irritated by what he discovered. Over the past two decades, Honduran life had 
unexpectedly risen from 50 to 65, whereas Soviet life expectancy had signs of decline. He 
realized that even though the USSR was more technologically advanced and economically more 
developed than Honduras, he would never have the same living standards as Gonzales. Why? 
Didn’t he deserve what Gonzalez had more than Gonzalez? After all, Russian submarines were 
roaming the oceans and the USSR was leading the world in space exploration, arts, sciences, and 
even ballet. Why should we endure increasing deprivation for the sake of great and noble goals? It 
dawned on him that even though the Soviet Union was “growing faster than the West,” so were 
its many struggles, causing him to think, “Why bother with socialism? If the USSR had 
capitalism, I would be far better off than Gonzales!”  
 
Though this story is total fiction, it captures the change in mood of the Soviet elite when the 
Soviet system had lost its dynamism. The Soviet Union’s political, technical, and intellectual elite 
were loyal to the USSR despite its lower welfare standards compared to Western countries 
because they were inspired by the constantly reducing gap with the West in per capita income and 
life expectancy. These elites believed that socialism as a social system was superior and that it 
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could beat out capitalism once it was “fully developed”. But when the USSR stopped growing 
faster than the West in the 1970s-80s, this belief system was shaken. 
 
2. Why the public did not vote against market reforms after they led to a collapse of living 
standards (1990s) 
In Eastern Europe in the early 1990s, reformers feared that losses accompanying the market 
transition could alienate voters from capitalism and bring anti-capitalist parties back to power. It 
is for this reason that the theorists behind shock therapy spoke about a “window of opportunities.” 
They believed that the reform plans should be drawn up almost in secrecy and implemented as 
soon as possible before the public came to its senses, in order to make the costs of turning back 
prohibitively high. “Concentration of political power, limited political competition and rapid 
implementation enhance the prospects for the successful adoption of economic reforms,” was how 
the EBRD Annual Report 1999 summed up the conventional wisdom of the time (EBRD, 1999, p. 
102).  
 
But the fear that the reforms could be delayed proved groundless (Castanheira, Popov, 2001). In the 
first half of the 1990s, Eastern European radical reform parties won three elections out of five, while 
parties favoring a slower pace of reform lost four elections out of four, and former communist parties 
lost two elections out of four [Aslund, Boone, Johnson, 1996]. Moreover, reforms were not halted in 
those Eastern European countries where the radical reformist parties (supporters of shock therapy) 
faced defeat. The aforementioned EBRD 1999 report dedicated to the political economy of reforms 
[EBRD, 1999, Chapter 5] shows that the economic reform index correlates with the dispersion of 
political power: Countries with restricted executive powers (presidential and/or prime ministerial), 
with governments based on coalitions rather than parliamentary majority, with frequently replaced 
governments or with a higher democracy index were generally ahead of others in the area of economic 
(pro-market, pro-capitalist) reforms. A study of cases in which reforms were stopped [(Hellman, 1998] 
demonstrated that rather than serving as a brake, the frequency of elections helped to promote reforms.  
 
Another study based on panel data for 25 post-communist countries [Dethier, Ghanem and Zoli, 1999] 
came to the conclusion that political democratization facilitated economic liberalization. Even the 
heaviest-hit groups (pensioners and the unemployed) voted in Eastern Europe for left-wing (formerly 
communist) parties, not only while they were in opposition but also when they came to power and 
continued the reforms [(Fidrmuc, 2000]. It was the left-wing parties that implemented privatization 
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and austerity programs, including pension reforms, in Hungary and Poland. In fact, more or less 
gradual reforms (gradualism) could only be carried out by authoritarian regimes (China, Vietnam 
before 1989, the USSR under Gorbachev, Belarus, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan), while states with 
competitive elections seemed to have no such option at all, because their electorate wanted everything, 
and right away, regardless of whether it was good for the economy. At any rate, no democratic country 
was actually able to implement gradual economic reforms.  
 
In Russia’s regions electoral preferences also correlated with the economic reform index (Figure 6) 
and remained sufficiently stable (Figure 7). The regions that voted more for pro-reform parties and 
candidates in 1993-96, and less for the Communists, were as a rule ahead of others in terms of price 
deregulation, small privatization and abolition of subsidies [Попов, 2000; Popov, 2001, 2004]. The 
reform efforts of regional governments were supported by the electorate even after controlling for 
objective factors, such as urbanization and education levels, previous drops in income levels, wage 
arrears and alcohol consumption [Warner, 2001].  
 
 
Figure 6. Political orientation of voters in 1993-96*/ and economic reform index in Russian 
regions**/ 
  
*/ Index of the political orientation of the electorate calculated by the Russian Union of Industrialists and Entrepreneurs. 
 **/ Economic reform index calculated as the average of indices of price liberalization, small privatization and share of 
subsidies in regional budgets and subsidies for agricultural products (for more detail, see: Popov, 2001). 
Source: Popov, 2001; Popov, 2004.  
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Figure 7. The electorate’s political orientations in Russian regions in 1993-96 and in 2000 
 
*/ Index of the political orientation of the electorate calculated by the Russian Union of Industrialists and Entrepreneurs. 
Source: Popov, 2001; Popov, 2004.  
 
 
Over the course of the reforms, the political orientations shifted dramatically to the right regardless of 
the fact that the reforms led to the deterioration of the economic and social status of the absolute 
majority of people. Opinion polls conducted in the USSR in 1989-90 reflected a generally negative 
attitude toward capitalism: the majority of respondents were clearly against land trade, although 
supporting family farms, and scorned the cooperatives that sold their products at market prices and 
served as a cover and euphemism for private businesses. Forty-seven percent supported the idea of 
private businesses, but over 50 percent believed that these should be small, family affairs deprived of 
the right to hire employees. Two-thirds of those polled said that state companies should prevail in the 
future Soviet economy [Izvestia, Feb. 26, 1990; Argumenty i Fakty, No. 21, 1990; Ekonomika i Zhizn, 
Nov. 2, 1990].  
 
A year later (1991), by voting for Yeltsin at the presidential elections, the population effectively 
approved his radical reform program that included shock therapy, rapid price deregulation and 
privatization. Why did the mood change so dramatically? 
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It's possible to indicate several specific causes that many people seem to have in mind, that are not the 
main ones. For example, neither the experts, nor the general public were capable of forecasting the 
future, and the prediction error was simply glaring. Table 1 shows that in 1990 the discussion of 
market transition options was based on predictions that production would grow by 25 to 50 percent 
before 1995, whereas in reality production declined by about one-third between 1990 and 1995.
1
 
 
 
Table 1. Two development scenarios submitted by the USSR Government to the Supreme Soviet 
in May 1990 
Year Indicator Shock therapy, change in the 
indicator from 1990, % 
Gradual transition, change in the 
indicator from 1990, % 
1991  GDP  -10…-15 -5… -9 
 Employment  -5… -7 -3… -5 
 Investment -47… -52 -14… -19 
 Real incomes  -4… -7 -1… -  
1995 GDP +44… +50 +25… +35 
 Employment  0… +2 0… +1 
 Investment +47… +57 +5… +10 
 Real incomes +25… +30 +5… +10 
Source: Ekonomika i Zhizn, 1990, No. 28. 
 
Another reason was the inability to forecast the growth in income inequality. Ordinary people seemed 
to be guided by past experience and the Soviet perceptions on low income inequality and living wage 
guarantees. In reality, income inequality grew dramatically: In the 1990s, 90 percent of people saw 
their real incomes reduced by more than half. The problem was eased somewhat by a significant cut in 
investment (meaning a greater share of consumption in the GDP) and the increase in export revenues  
                                                          
1
 In the late 1980s, practically all experts expected that market reforms would accelerate production growth. In 1989, 
I wrote an essay entitled, “Tighten Your Belts, Hard Times Are Ahead,” which predicted a 25-30 percent production 
decline in the next three to five years. Several Soviet newspapers refused to publish it on the grounds that it was 
excessively alarmist (it was published in English in Geonomics Newsletter, May-June 1991). But even in 1990, when 
a cutback in production began both in Russia and in Eastern Europe, a market transition program, 500 Days, 
predicted the following: A temporary production decline (not defined in quantitative terms) during the first 400 days 
of the market reform, unemployment growth from four percent in 1990 to eight percent in 1991, and a stabilization of 
the living standards throughout the transitional period (Shatalin, 1990). In fact, the production decline continued for 
almost 10 years, not 400 days, and amounted to 45 percent, unemployment increased to 13 percent by 1999, and real 
incomes dropped by 40 percent from 1991 to 1998 (Figure 8).  
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with higher oil, gas and metal prices that fetched an additional $400 billion a year
2
, or almost $3,000 
per capita a year. But even after accounting for these factors, it was not until 20 years later (or by the 
2008-2009 crisis) that the majority of people could bring their real incomes to the level of the late 
1980s. Thus, the majority was badly affected by the market transition, which they had themselves 
supported.  
 
But these are not the main factors, and they cannot fully explain why the majority backed the reforms. 
After all, even the production decline and growing inequality failed to make the electorate swing to 
the left and demand nationalization of natural resources and introduction of a progressive income tax, 
let alone more radical leftist measures unsupported by the majority in the 21
st
 century. Many countries 
did not enjoy windfall gains (“money for old rope”), such as oil revenues, but even these countries 
witnessed a shift towards big business interests in public preferences. The main thing, therefore, seem 
to be the irrational stereotypes persisting in the mass consciousness despite facts and logic: high taxes 
and a big state are harmful for economic growth, while the likelihood of getting rich quick is higher 
than the chance of benefiting from progressive taxes. These stereotypes, in turn, are perpetuated by the 
media and the political system, which are largely controlled by big business.  
 
3. Do we all want to be richer than others? (The 21st century)  
It was observed long ago that social groups often support measures that are at odds with their interests. 
Even advanced democracies approve decisions that run counter to the interests of the majority. A 
recent book on inequality by Joseph Stiglitz [Stiglitz, 2012] investigates precisely this paradox: in 
democratic societies, even modest measures to restrict major fortunes (such as a progressive income 
tax) are not supported by the majority of the public, even though they are in their own interests. 
Unless there are special limitations on the involvement of private capital in the media, advertising and 
elections, the holders of major fortunes would easily impose on the mass consciousness the ideas that 
promote their interests and run counter to the interests of the public. Formally, elections are based on 
the principle of one man-one vote, but their results are actually the same as in a joint-stock company, 
where one vote equals one dollar.  
 
US congressional election studies [Jacobson, 1978] show that campaign financing is the most 
significant factor explaining the victories by candidates (particularly new figures, who previously 
                                                          
2 
Russian exports grew from $46 billion in 1992 to $523 billion in 2013, which was mostly due to higher oil, gas and 
metal prices.  
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never held elected office). This direct campaign financing, however, is not the whole story, financing 
of the media, non-profit organizations, political parties and associations, researchers, advertisers and 
many other shapers of public opinion matters a great deal. Each voter seeks to increase his or her 
prosperity, but how to do this and what candidates to support is something that is largely, if not 
decisively, determined by the prevailing stereotypes formed as a result of financing efforts.  
 
The Russian population, like any other, wants better living standards and a better social climate. 
Growing incomes and longer life expectancies, lower unemployment and crime rates in Russia, like in 
other countries, all other things being equal, lead to greater satisfaction with life and higher evaluation 
of one's prosperity/happiness (Table 2 and Figure 8). But the policy that is needed to promote personal 
incomes and life expectancy is an area where mass consciousness is irrational and reflects the interests 
of big business and the most well-to-do groups, rather than the middle class, let alone the poor.  
 
 
Table 2. Answers to the question “Are you happy?” (% of total respondents) and Happiness 
Index in Russia, according to VTSIOM polls 
Month, 
year 
6/ 
1990 
5/ 
1991 
2/ 
1992 
2/ 
1998 
3/ 
2008 
3/ 
2010 
9/ 
2009 
3/ 
2010 
9/ 
2010 
4/ 
2011 
9/ 
2011 
4/ 
2012 
4/ 
2013 
4/ 
2014 
Definitely 
yes  
5 8 2 16 22 19 19 20 14 19 15 21 23 25 
Basically 
yes 
39 52 40 44 55 50 53 52 56 48 51 56 54 53 
Basically 
no 
22 24 31 19 12 16 17 14 19 20 21 16 15 22 
Definitely 
no 
5 5 5 6 3 5 4 3 3 5 4 2 3 2 
Hard to 
say 
29 12 23 15 8 11 7 11 9 8 9 5 6 8 
Index  17 31 6 35 62 48 51 55 48 43 41 59 59 64 
Note: Happiness Index is the difference between the percentage of respondents who said that they were happy and 
those who stated that they were unhappy. 
Source: Russian Public Opinion Research Center (VTSIOM) 
(http://wciom.ru/index.php?id=459&uid=114812) 
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Figure 8. Real Income Index and Happiness Index  
 
Source: State Committee for Statistics (Goskomstat) (www.gks.ru), Russian economic statistics 
base, HSE website (http://sophist.hse.ru/exes/tables/HHI_Q_I.htm) , VTSIOM  
(http://wciom.ru/index.php?id=459&uid=114812) 
 
 
It is quite clear, for example, that the majority of the population will benefit from the introduction of a 
progressive income tax, and that the likelihood of becoming so rich as to be in the highest income tax 
bracket is slimmer than the chance of benefitting from a high income tax through greater access to 
public goods (education, healthcare, etc.) and better social insurance. Nevertheless, the majority of 
people are against a steep tax rate progression.  
 
It is also patently clear that free education and healthcare is in the interests of the majority of people, 
but this system is uncommon in developing countries. To maximally increase the average life 
expectancy, if we consider an oligarch’s life to be as valuable as that of a poor person, the limited 
resources that society is prepared to allocate to the healthcare system should certainly be distributed 
evenly, or more precisely, in conformity with medical indications. But in all democracies, even if they 
offer a minimum of medical services for free, the rich are able to receive better medical assistance. 
Strictly speaking, free healthcare and education was only introduced in poor countries by authoritarian 
socialist governments (the USSR, China, Cuba), while in democracies at the same development level 
these were largely paid services, which accounted for their lower life expectancy and education levels. 
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It is extremely difficult to alter stereotypes in the public consciousness. One study [Gentzkow, 
Shapiro, 2010] argues that the press bias is explained by electoral preferences rather than the 
political orientation of a newspaper owner. In the traditionally Republican constituencies, for 
example, newspapers hold a Republican orientation, because readers prefer to find confirmation 
(rather than refutation) of their views, while press earnings (advertising revenues) depend on 
circulation. So, this creates a vicious circle: conservative voters like information that confirms 
their views => media concerned with larger circulation are eager to provide this information => 
voters are even more confirmed in their conservative views… 
 
It would seem this vicious circle can be broken either by reforms from above banning big 
business involvement in the media and the political process (certain European countries – 
specifically the Scandinavian countries, with their public funding of political parties and the 
media – have come closer to this system than others), or by revolutions occurring when the gap 
between the stereotypes in the public consciousness (opportunities for enrichment) and the reality 
(impoverishment) reaches a critical level. 
 
*** 
 
To conclude, the public consciousness in the USSR reflected real economic changes, specifically 
disappointment with socialism that was felt, albeit with a considerable time lag, by both the 
Soviet elite and the public following the loss of social dynamism in the 1970s and the 1980s. 
Views of the future are mostly formed on the basis of an extrapolation of past tendencies 
(adaptive expectations), while one's own opportunities and abilities are as a rule strongly 
overestimated (consider the contradictory mass confidence of the 1990s in the preservation of low 
inequality and personal economic success). However, in undeveloped democracies (that lack 
effective barriers to big business involvement in politics), the media and election campaigns are 
controlled by owners of major fortunes and upper-income groups which results in a vicious circle. 
Market reforms and privatization bring forth a class of rich proprietors (“oligarchs”), who both 
have a stake in maintaining their economic and political influence through the media and 
democratic elections, and possess the necessary leverage to achieve this end. Public preferences 
can only return to “normal” – to stereotypes reflecting the interests of the majority – if the media 
and the political process as a whole are separated from big business and private funding.  
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